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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to explain the architecture and design choices of the exchange. Lykke is a
FinTech company based in Zurich that has launched the global marketplace for all asset classes and
instruments digitized on the blockchain. The authors discuss how the exchange will evolve over time. They
explore the macroeconomic beneﬁts of the new blockchain technology. The Lykke exchange is compatible
with any type of public blockchain.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors present the architecture of an exchange for colored
coins. By colored coins, they mean issuer-backed securities on the Bitcoin blockchain. Orders are collected and
matched by a semi-trusted exchange. Matched orders are settled on the Bitcoin blockchain, where each
successful trade between parties appears as a set atomic-colored coins swap transactions. Unﬁlled and
expired orders are discarded. The exchange does not take possession of the traded coins, but needs to be
trusted to match trades correctly.
Findings – Lykke has launched the exchange initially for the main currencies, cryptocurrencies and Lykke
coin (entitlement to the shares of Lykke company). Perspective asset classes include futures and options on
digital assets, crowd-funded loans for retail and private equity ﬁnancing for small and medium-sized
enterprises, contracts for difference, zero coupon bonds and other ﬁxed income and natural capital bonds.
Originality/value – Lykke exchange and all its tools and services are open source; the transparency of
technology is ideal for research. The paper provides a high-level overview of the exchange and concludes with
a research agenda.
Keywords Blockchain, Alternative trading systems, Coloured coins
Paper type Case study
1. Introduction
The ﬁnancial system architecture has grown organically. Over the past 40 years, individual
steps of the workﬂow of ﬁnancial transactions have been computerized; the business
process remained unchanged, as if processing continued to be manual. Delivery and
settlement of transaction is batch based and occurs with a time delay of two and more days
and does not happen at the time of the trade. The outcome is a convoluted banking
architecture, a pile of spaghetti. Every bank has its own bookkeeping system and is an
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island from an audit point of view, where veriﬁcation of trades is cumbersome and prone to
errors. This regime contributes to a high degree of fragmentation and uncertainty in the
market, multiplication of risk factors, high transaction costs for ﬁnancial assets and lack of
liquidity and transparency in ﬁnancial markets.
In attempt to rewire the current ﬁnancial system, Lykke builds a global internet
exchange, where all ﬁnancial instruments will be traded and exchanged against each other,
whatever their asset class or the size of transaction. Every ﬁnancial instrument will be a
listed security in the form of a digital token and all transactions will be logged in a
universally accessible distributed ledger, a decentralized notary service that ensures
immediate global consensus about completed transactions and asset ownership. Like the
internet itself, the ledger is not controlled by a single entity, but an emergent phenomenon
consisting of its participants. Trades will be settled and validated immediately; processing
will be digital and transaction costs will be minuscule. The ledger includes a wallet, so that
every owner of a digital coin has his own private key protecting his ownership. There will be
an intraday interest rate market and yield curve. Market participants will be able to buy and
sell colored coins of different issuers and change counterparty risk at any time. The number
of traded ﬁnancial instruments will grow exponentially, transaction volumes will skyrocket
and liquidity will be ample.
Lykke aims to become the global marketplace and establish itself as the backbone of a
new and highly sophisticated banking architecture that is not plagued by the deﬁciencies of
the present system. This paper introduces the architecture of Lykke exchange and provides
the details on the ﬁrst months of trading.
2. Blockchain and colored coins
Blockchain is a way to ﬁnd a consensus among a multitude of servers in the absence of
mutual trust. Most blockchain variants follow a proof-of-work protocol, which provides
strong economic incentives for contributing to the network security (mining).
Open blockchain is a great platform to build other services on top, as it is an independent
technology without any vendor lock-in or other entity behind it that might abuse it one day
to further their strategic agenda. Examples of other such open decentralized technologies
that serve as a platform for others to build on are Linux, email or the internet. A blockchain
should be the technology of choice for projects that beneﬁt from high inter-operability and
versatility in use.
As soon as the involved parties can be trusted, there are usually more efﬁcient solutions
than a distributed ledger. When the main issue is unreliable hardware that can otherwise be
trusted, the Paxos algorithm is typically used. This is what Google does to provide reliable
services with commodity hardware. Then, there are multiple database solutions that can be
the most efﬁcient in principle but require highly reliable hardware and also complete trust in
the operator. Decentralization comes at a cost.
Open platform technologies can unleash enormous powers, which would not materialize
in a centralized setup. The classic example is the internet, which thrives because of its open
architecture and which has quickly outrun all alternative approaches (e.g. the French
Minitel). Another example is Linux, which serves as an operating system for the majority of
servers in the internet. Its main advantage is the fact that a company can commit to using it
without becoming dependent on a potential competitor. A third example is the email
protocol, which is being used to send billions of messages every day. Email would never
have ﬂourished to the same extent if it was directly controlled by a company. Similarly,
Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008) is often seen as the open platform for ﬁnance.
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Originally, Bitcoin was most popular among cypherpunks and crypto-anarchists. To this
day, Bitcoin has a signiﬁcant number of proponents from that background, who love Bitcoin
for its libertarian philosophy and who cherish it as digital gold. Driven by a vast inﬂow of
venture capital, Bitcoin is gaining broader traction among early adopters whose enthusiasm
stemsmore from Bitcoin’s usefulness and versatility than from its technical brilliance.
Since 2014, Bitcoin saw unprecedented inﬂows of venture capital. It is one of a
number of growing startups that have each raised venture capital in the double digit
millions. While most Bitcoin startups are proﬁt-driven with a clear plan for generating
revenue, Blockstream which recently raised 21 million is a remarkable exception.
Unlike other Bitcoin startups, Blockstream aims at improving the Bitcoin
infrastructure itself – without obvious ﬁnancial beneﬁt. Its investors argue that there is
huge value in being able to help shaping the future of the Bitcoin protocol and being at
the forefront of Bitcoin development.
Given the price estimates of the current mining hardware[1], it would cost above USD300
million in hardware to acquire enough computing power to dominate the Bitcoin network.
Initially, enthusiasts and hobbyists with desktop PCs and later graphics cards equipped
with parallelized chip architecture did Bitcoin mining. Today, Bitcoin mining has become a
professional endeavor, with custom-designed chips and a value chain of specialized services.
Hardware manufacturers such as Bitmain Technologies or BitFury design and manufacture
specialized ASIC chips. The miners operate the hardware – typically in locations with low
electricity costs and sell the generated computing power to mining pools, which, in turn,
redistribute the freshly minted coins and earned transaction fees back to the miners.
The Bitcoin blockchain is currently the largest blockchain in operation. The hardware
cost to match the computing power that currently secures the Bitcoin blockchain is likely in
the triple-digit millions, if not higher. When measuring security as the USD cost of an attack,
the most secure blockchain currently in existence is the Bitcoin blockchain. There are
alternative cryptocurrencies that add security in principle thanks to certain tweaks. Litecoin,
for example, uses a hashing algorithm that makes it harder to create specialized mining
chips. Ethereum follows a plan to discourage a professionalization in mining and switch to
the proof-of-stake consensus model. But the sheer amount of computing power securing the
Bitcoin blockchain dwarfs the effect of those tweaks. One cannot rule out that other
cryptocurrencies succeed at taking the lead security-wise in the medium-term future, but for
now, the Bitcoin blockchain remains the most secure platform to build on.
The value of a currency strongly depends on the number of participants[2], which, in
turn, attracts more participants, leading to a network effect. Thus, Bitcoin has a signiﬁcant
ﬁrst-mover-advantage, which plays out threefold:
 The more users there are, the more useful Bitcoin becomes, as there are more places
to spend Bitcoin and counterparties to exchange Bitcoin with, attracting even more
users.
 Currencies require trust, but trust can only be built over time, thus – everything else
equal – giving the oldest currency a natural edge over its competitors.
 The more volume there is, the more transaction fees there are, attracting more
miners and making the network more secure, which, in turn, again attracts
additional users and volume.
With currencies that serve as a store of wealth, there is an additional lock-in insofar as it is
takes effort to transfer that wealth into other currencies. Thus, there are multiple effects in
place that make it very hard to dethrone Bitcoin.
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Every ﬁnancial instrument can become a listed security on the blockchain in the form of
a digital token: on Bitcoin blockchain, it is implemented through the various Colored Coin
protocols (Open Asset, Colu, etc.). Colored coins (Rosenfeld, 2012) follow the idea of
“coloring” a speciﬁc Bitcoin – the issuer guarantees to hand out the underlying assets to the
person, who returns the colored coin. For example, the Federal Reserve (FED) can issue a
colored coin in the same way as it prints paper money; it would take a fraction of a Bitcoin
and then insert the “I Owe You” statement of the FED, like a regular bank note. The same
mechanism can be used for any other ﬁnancial claim. Colored coins are different in nature
than cryptocurrencies because they have a speciﬁc issuer and are backed by a real ﬁnancial
asset.
Reporting of colored coins in traditional banking software systems, such as bookkeeping
and risk management is straightforward because every colored coin can include an
International Securities Identiﬁcation Number (ISIN), thus can be treated as any other
ﬁnancial instrument, fully compatible with existing back-ofﬁce systems. Financial
institutions can create colored coins for existing ﬁnancial products and gradually move
business processes to blockchain. They can operate the old and new system in parallel and
switch over to the new system at their own pace. In the new system, interest rate payments
are second by second improving liquidity provision.
The criticism of the colored coin approach, summarized in Swanson (2015), includes the
inability of the miners to validate the colored coin transaction (Bitcoin mining pools are not
color aware), difﬁculty for governmental organization to enforce sanctions in a public
blockchain, probabilistic settlement ﬁnality and excessive transparency of the public
blockchain.
The advantages of using Bitcoin blockchain as a ledger for asset tokenization leverage
its immutability, non-counterfeitability, ease of transfer, robustness and transparency and
protection from double spending. The issuer risk still exists – colored coins are as good as its
issuer.
2.1 Summary
To summarize, Bitcoin is one of those technologies in which people see the potential to
disrupt the world. It illustrates the power that open platforms can unfold. There are various
competitors and clones, but none of them comes close to the popularity and success of
Bitcoin. The many unsuccessful attempts of creating competing coins show that one should,
whenever feasible, ride the wave and build on top of Bitcoin instead of creating one’s own
proprietary ledger. By building on top of Bitcoin, one can leverage the power if its
blockchain, which has been continuously running for over six years and amassed
computing power worth hundreds of millions, thereby enabling a lean business model that
stands on the shoulders of a giant.
3. Colored coins exchange architecture
We present the architecture of an exchange for colored coins. By colored coins, we mean
issuer-backed securities on the Bitcoin blockchain. Orders are collected and matched by a
semi-trusted exchange. Matched orders are settled on the Bitcoin blockchain, where each
successful trade between parties appears as a set atomic-colored coins swap transactions.
Unﬁlled and expired orders are discarded. The exchange does not take possession of the
traded coins but needs to be trusted to match trades correctly. Assuming a basic level of
trust in the trader – which could, for example, be established by providing collateral –
trading can take place as fast as the communication between trader and exchange permits,
with a subsequent settlement on the blockchain.
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3.1 Design considerations
Exchanges for cryptocurrencies can be organized with a different degree of centralization.
Typically, centralized exchanges are much more efﬁcient, whereas decentralized exchanges
are more secure, as they require less trust in the exchange. Owing to their higher efﬁciency
and simplicity, most volume is currently traded on centralized exchanges such as BTC
China, Bitstamp or Bitﬁnex[3]. A trader on such an exchange must entrust all assets in his
trading account to the exchange. History shows that this is not without risk, with the most
famous examples being the collapse of MtGox (more than 600,000 Bitcoins disappeared) and
the most recent hacking of Bitﬁnex (120,000 stolen Bitcoins). Exchanges such as Bitcoin.de
and LocalBitcoins are more decentralized and restrict themselves to organize trades and
offer escrow services, but let the traders execute the actual trade bilaterally, whereas traders
on LocalBitcoins often even meet physically. This naturally limits the achievable speed of
trading to the speed of the underlying payment system (e.g. SEPA or moving bank notes).
These exchanges can achieve a much higher trading frequency without having to resort to
client deposits by restricting themselves to cryptocurrencies that can be exchanged
instantly. Examples of such exchanges or whole cryptocurrency systems that include built-
in decentralized exchanges are Omni, Counterparty and BitsharesX – none of which
achieved the same commercial success yet as the aforementioned centralized exchanges.
These exchanges frequently try to even decentralize the matching of trades, which is
problematic, as it is fundamentally hard to enforce rules in a decentralized system,
especially when timing is crucial. For the design of our exchange, we opt for a system with
centralized matching of trades, but with direct bilateral exchange of assets, trying to
combine the best of both worlds (see the comparison of Lykke exchange with the other types
of crypto-exchanges in the Table I). One should also note that, when trading a particular
colored coins or any other issuer-backed asset, there is exposure to a centralized point of
failure anyway, namely, the issuer.
We follow the design principles of simplicity and minimal risk. Thus, we prefer proven
systems with known shortcomings that are good enough for our purposes over theoretically
better systems. The best validated blockchain is clearly Bitcoin, with a blockchain spanning
back more than ﬁve years. Unfortunately, the Bitcoin network only supports one asset, the
Bitcoin. One way to overcome this would be to create an adapted version and to operate a
separate blockchain that runs that adapted protocol. With a separate blockchain, one cannot
beneﬁt from all the computing power securing the Bitcoin network, calling for further
adaptions, such as abandoning proof-of-work (majority of computing power says which
transactions settle) for proof-of-stake (majority of coin wealth says which transactions settle)
or something entirely different. The path of building a custom ledger has been chosen by a
number of cryptocurrencies, such as Ethereum. This leads to the risks of over-engineering
and stepping into uncharted territories, which are both hard to control.
Thus, instead of creating yet another distributed ledger, we decided to make use of the
colored coins approach, which builds on top of the Bitcoin blockchain. As the name
suggests, colored coins follow the idea of “coloring” a speciﬁc Bitcoin, with an issuers
guaranteeing to hand out the underlying assets to whoever returns that colored Bitcoins (or
a fraction thereof). Thus, such colored coins are always linked to Bitcoins – like physical
coins being bound to a few grams of a metal that also has a value in itself and is independent
of the currency value. Further limitations are discussed in the scalability section. Current
implementation of the Lykke exchange operates with Open Asset colored coins protocol[4].
The proposed exchange is positioned in between completely decentralized proposals
(such as Counterparty) and completely centralized ones (such as Bitstamp). Decentralized
approaches tend to come with signiﬁcant overhead, for example, by creating an entry on the
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blockchain for every issued order. Centralized exchanges are much more efﬁcient, but
require the exchange to take possession over the assets of the traders as deposits, which in
many jurisdictions comes with certain regulatory duties (e.g. requiring a banking license).
Our approach ﬁnds a middle ground between those two. Only completed trades enter the
blockchain, while unﬁlled orders are discarded. At the same time, assets can be traded
ad hoc and are directly transferred between the trading parties, thereby letting the exchange
act as a mere broker without clients’ deposits.
There are three involved parties:
(1) Issuers issue IOUs as colored coins. These coins can represent currencies,
stocks or any other transferable asset. An exchange can demand from the
issuer to ﬁle a formal application for his coins to be listed, but there is no
technical necessity to do so. In principle, any colored coins could be traded on
an exchange – even without the consent of the issuer. The role of the issuers is
passive; all they can do is observing completed trades as they settle on the
blockchain.
(2) Traders possess Bitcoins or colored coins and desire to trade them for other assets.
Traders typically need to be registered with the exchange to establish a basic level
of trust (e.g. legally or by providing a collateral). To initiate trades, they send
orders to an exchange of their choice. The traded assets must reside on a Bitcoin
address associated with the trader’s account on the exchange. Traders primarily
communicate directly with the exchange, but should also observe the blockchain to
verify the correct settlement of their trades.
Table I.
Comparative
analysis of the
exchanges with
different degree of
centralization
Criteria Centralized exchanges Decentralized exchanges
Semi-centralized
exchanges
Examples Bitﬁnex, Poloniex, Kraken,
Bitstamp
0x, EtherDelta,
Counterparty, BitsharesX,
LocalBitcoins, Bitcoin.de
Lykke
Trust User entrusts all assets in
his trading account to the
exchange
User does not entrust the
assets to the exchange
User does not entrust the
assets to the exchange
Privacy Users are required to
disclose their personal
details
Users are not required to
disclose their personal
details, except if the
exchange method involves
bank transfers
Users are not required to
disclose their personal
details, except if the
exchange method
involves bank transfers
Risk of hacks High
(because the exchange
controls all the funds)
Low
(because of the direct
ownership on the funds)
Low
(because of the direct
ownership on the funds)
Centralized
matching engine
Yes No Yes
Speed of
transaction
execution
Fast
(because of the centralized
matching engine)
Slow Fast (because of the
centralized matching
engine)
Advanced trading
functionalities (like
margin trading,
lending and stop
loss)
Easy to implement (because
of the centralized matching
engine)
Very difﬁcult (or even
impossible) to implement
Easy to implement
(because of the centralized
matching engine)
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(3) Exchanges wait for traders to send them orders and collect them in an order book.
The usual order types are supported (bid, ask, limit, etc.). Matched trades are
settled on the blockchain. In principle, any asset pair can be traded, but in practice,
market forces will probably let a dominating currency emerge (similar to the US
dollars in classical foreign exchange). There could be various competing
exchanges.
3.2 Design description
Traders create an order by creating and signing a collateral transaction to send x coins to
the exchange, whereas x is the amount and type of coins they intend to sell. Unlike usual
transactions, this collateral transaction is not sent to the Bitcoin network, but to the
exchange instead, along with additional information about the order (type, asset to buy,
limit, etc.). The collateral transaction guarantees settlement for the matched trade in case if
trader is ofﬂine. The provided collateral transaction will never be broadcasted over the
Bitcoin network if client signs atomic swap transaction for the matched trade. As soon as
the exchange receives a matching order containing a second collateral transaction, the
exchange creates an atomic swap transaction that sends the exchanged amounts to the two
traders and asks both traders to sign it. Broadcasting of the atomic swap transaction signed
by both traders will invalidate guarantee transactions, while it is spending the same
outputs. If one of the trader is ofﬂine and not able to sign, the swap transaction exchange
uses collateral transactions and sends the exchanged amounts to the two traders. Unﬁlled or
cancelled orders are simply discarded.
3.3 Partial trades
Most of the time, one of the involved orders will only be partially ﬁlled. The remaining funds
are immediately returned to the sender for resubmission of the remaining trade. For
example, if trader Toni issues an order to sell USD100 for Euros and his order is
immediately matched with USD80 worth of counter-orders, the remaining USD20 are sent
back to Toni along with the acquired Euros. Toni’s trading software then automatically
creates and signs a new order to sell the remaining USD20.
3.4 Matching engine with price-spread-time priority
Lykke exchange implements a new type of queuing system for the limit orders. The
queuing system is price-spread-time dependent because it rewards market participants
for quoting two-way prices and revealing information about their price expectation.
Market participants who are conﬁdent that the price level will remain unchanged, will
offer low spreads, they will get preferential treatment and will move ahead in the queue.
High-frequency traders will not be able to extract an unfair advantage from the pending
limit orders as is the case today with price-time queuing systems that are standard. The
innovation translates into improved price discovery with lower price volatility and
improved market efﬁciency. The price-spread-time queuing system is a major
innovation for the industry of electronic market places, which use queuing systems that
are only price-time dependent.
3.5 Multisignature wallets
To be able to trade, traders should deposit coins into exchange. Depositing coins is not equal
to trusting coins. Exchange uses 2-of-2 multisignatures address wallets to deposit trader’s
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coins. 2-of-2 multisignature address requires two signatures to spend coins from it – both
trader’s and exchange’s signatures (Figure 1).
MultiSig wallet provides the following advantages:
 Deposit does not mean trust: Exchange cannot spend coins without trader’s key.
Even if the exchange is compromised and the exchange’s key is stolen, the trader
will not lose his coins. The second key is required to spend deposited coins.
 Coins ﬂow control: On the other hand, exchange’s signature is required for each
transaction. Deposited coins cannot be transferred outside the exchange without
exchange being aware of it.
 Green nodes network: Identiﬁed clients only (KYC) are allowed to trade. A trader is
able to spend deposited coins whether for trading inside the exchange or for
withdrawal. A trader cannot transfer the coins outside the exchange green nodes
network if it’s not allowed by the issuer.
What happens with deposited coins if exchange’s private key is destroyed? Would the
deposited coins be frozen in the multisignatures address forever? To guarantee funds
recovery from the MultiSig wallet, exchange provides offchain refund transactions
(Figure 2).
Refund transaction sends deposited coins back to the trader’s private address. Once the
refund transaction is signed by exchange and trader, the refund can be broadcasted after 31
days. The refund transaction is invalidated each time when the trader makes a trade that
spends “refunded” outputs. Exchange generates a new refund transaction after each new
trade and sends the transaction binary ﬁle to the trader’s mail. The trader may use the
refund in case of emergency.
Exchange monitors new transactions on the blockchain and detects if the valid refund
transaction was broadcasted. It is considered as withdrawal.
Figure 1.
2-of-2 Multisignature
address used to
deposit trader’s coins
Figure 2.
Off the blockchain
refund transaction is
signed by the
exchange
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3.6 Settlement capacity
Generally, all received coins can immediately be reused in a new trade. Thus, trading can be
as fast as the connection between trader and exchange permits (normally in the range of
10-100 ms). Temporarily, the number of trades can exceed the limits given by the Bitcoin
blockchain, as this just leads to a delayed settlement. Note that the size of the collateral (or
amount of trust in the trader) should cover the potential net gain of the trader when
unwinding the unsettled transactions. Thus, the exchange should measure that potential net
gain and block further trading in case it approaches the size of the collateral.
Upon the implementation of recent SegWit soft-fork, the Bitcoin network will have a limit
of about 780,000 transactions per day[5]. Today, the network processes about 200,000
transactions per day[6]. As soon as the number of issued transactions hits the limit, miners
will start to drop the ones with the lowest fees. As every dropped transaction means a loss of
potential revenue, they will likely push for an increase of the limit in such a scenario. The
actual technical limit according to core developer Gavin Andresen is in the range of
hundreds of millions of transactions per day[7].
To mitigate capacity limit, Lightning Network[8] (Poon and Dryja, 2016) and
Micropayment channels[9] are the perspective approaches. Instead of broadcasting of each
single transaction on the blockchain parties deliver coins by sending signed transaction
messages offchain with subsequent net settlement on the blockchain.
3.7 Micropayment channels approach
Micropayment channel is based on the 2-of-2 multisignature address where both parties of
the channel deposit coins into the address and communicate off the blockchain. The current
balance of parties is stored as the most recent offchain refund transaction signed by both
parties, spending from the multisignature address. Bitcoin Opcode OP_
CHECKSECVENCEVERIFY (BIP-0112) is available for relative lock-time on mainnet
Bitcoin blockchain from May 2016. This opcode can be used for providing revocable refund
transaction for the multisignature payment channel address[10]. To make a transfer, client
sends a signed refund transaction message spending the corresponding volume of coins
from the multisignature address. The ﬁnal refund transaction signed by both parties can be
broadcasted when the parties withdraw their coins.
3.8 Payment Hubs
Payment Hub acts as an intermediary for transferring money from one point to another.
Traders who need to exchange an asset in a scalable way would open micropayment
channels with Payment Hubs. When one wants to send US dollar coins to the exchange he/
she would send coins to the US dollar Payment Hub using the channel, then the hub sends
its coins to the exchange using another channel. Payment Hubs cannot steal coins on the
way to exchange because of using hash lock protection[11]. Payment Hubs provide coins in
the payment channel address for being able to route payments effectively. Exchange sends
Euro coins back to the trader using another Euro Payment Hub that provides liquidity for
the Euro coins. Issuers of coins may act as Payment Hubs to provide transferring of the
issued coins in the scalable way (Figure 3).
3.9 Attacks
Malicious traders could prevent the settlement of a trade by issuing a competing transaction
that sends the offered coins elsewhere. Doing this is trivial as long as the order is pending
and thus no transaction published – but assuming that the exchange provides an option to
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cancel pending orders, there is no motivation to do so as both result in the same, namely, the
cancellation of the order.
A malicious trader might also regret an order after it was matched and sent to the network,
thus wanting to disrupt settlement. As transactions spread quickly through the Bitcoin
network, successfully issuing a competing transaction to prevent that regretted trade would
require collusion with the miner who happens to mine the next block – something a large
mining pool probably would not want to risk its reputation for as such cheating attempts are
perfectly detectable. The easy detectability also allows to automatically trigger counter-
measures such as freezing the collateral of the trader or banning the trader.
A related attack is based on transaction malleability. Transaction malleability is a
weakness in the Bitcoin protocol that allows anyone to slightly alter a transaction in ways
that cause the transaction to change its id (hash). Should the altered transaction enter the
blockchain instead of the original one, already issued follow-up transactions will be
orphaned and fail, as they use the original ID to refer to their predecessor. The necessary
adaptations to the Bitcoin protocol to ﬁx this are known and implemented.
Another attack on the system could be performed by the exchange itself. If hacked or run by
a malicious operator, whoever controls the exchange could potentially take possession of all
assets in all currently pending orders. This is already much better than the risk of traditional
exchanges like MtGox to misappropriate all their clients accounts, but is still a signiﬁcant risk
that needs to be addressed through according security and regulatorymeasures.
All the aforementioned risks pale in comparison to the counterparty risk inherent in
colored coins. Regardless of how securely the exchange is organized, an issuer of colored
coins could default or misappropriate the underlying assets. An exchange can help to
alleviate this risk by only, allowing the trade of coins from veriﬁed issuers with quantiﬁable
counterparty risk. This risk can be mitigated by diversifying coins across multiple issuers
and by swapping to coins that are deemed less risky if necessary.
3.10 Leveraged trading
To provide leveraged trading, an intermediary service such as a bank willing to provide
credit is necessary. This is basically the same as traditional leveraged trading. Instead of
directly trading on the exchange with their ownwallets, traders will transfer their assets to a
managed wallet. Such a managed wallet resembles a bank account, with the bank managing
the wallet having full control over the contained assets. Like in classical banking, orders
issued by the traders go to the bank ﬁrst, where they are veriﬁed, and then sent to the
Figure 3.
Both exchange and
traders have
micropayment
channels with
payment hubs to be
able to transfer
multiple types of
coins off the
blockchain
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exchange. The bank can then offer credit to the trader, which is added to the managed
account. But as soon as the account is not sufﬁciently covered any more, the margin call is
issued, the assets liquidated, and outstanding credit returned to the bank.
3.11 Information technology architecture
The Lykke exchange was developed since December 2015 and went live beta on March 2016
with wider industry test started in May 2016. The infrastructure consists of the following
components:
 Matching engine;
 Lykke backend (Microsoft Azure);
 Blockchain of Bitcoin/Open Asset colorcore;
 Issuer UI;
 Lykke Wallet app (iOS/Android); and
 Market making algorithms.
Lykke exchange and all its tools and services are fully open source[12]. Total size of Lykke
code in Github repository has recently reached 3.3 mln lines, with own (not-forked) code
exceeding 3 mln (Figure 4).
Figure 4.
Lykke exchange
high-level
architecture
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The development process has started as a result of a competition launched in September
2015. Three prizes were awarded to the three submissions that were received. The proposed
projects were complementary to the design of FX platform and the asset protocol, and this
helped to form a core of the Lykke team.
3.12 Crowd-based approach to resources
The company organization is inspired by the principles that govern dynamic systems in
nature, such as the human body. Lykke implements an emergent structure, where processes
are crowd-based and contributors are incentivized with prizes in many different shapes and
forms. Prize-payouts have a scaling property with many small prizes. The scaling property
of prizes reward many individuals and nurture talent on a broader scale than the typical
approach of just offering one ﬁrst, one second and one third prize. We successfully applied
this idea in the design competition for the exchange.
The company has a small core group of managers; they are mandated to get the
processes going, ﬁne tune operations or have very speciﬁc technical expertise. We use the
crowd process as a screening mechanism to identify highly dedicated and gifted employees.
The crowd-based management principle has to our knowledge never been implemented as
radically as envisioned for Lykke. There are, however, examples of companies and non-
proﬁt organizations that have followed similar management principles, such as Wikipedia,
Mozilla or Open Source Initiatives, such as Bitcoin or Eclipse. The productivity of these
initiatives in terms of output relative to cost is an indication that the crowd-based strategy
may surpass expectations.
3.13 Summary
Building a secure, high-performance exchange for colored coins is technically feasible.
There is a number of trade-offs between performance and security. In a trusted
environment, the highest performance is reached, whereas a completely secure setup
comes at a price of slower transactions. Both approaches can be mixed depending on
requirements. Blockchain technology allows to run such a crypto-exchange in a fully
transparent and open way, potentially allowing for anyone to trade on it with minimal
trust requirements and providing a platform for other crypto-services to build on.
Current implementation of the Lykke exchange operates with Open Asset colored coins
protocol and 2-of-2 multisignature wallets. Lykke exchange and all its tools and
services are fully open source.
4. Conclusion
As once formulated by Paul Buchheit: “Bitcoin may be the TCP/IP of money” [13]. The
money transmission protocols will evolve and in future there will be many blockchain-based
digital assets. The important component that is missing is a global market place that
enables exchange of digital assets. Lykke builds such a global internet exchange, where all
ﬁnancial instruments will be traded and exchanged against each other, whatever their asset
class or the size of transaction.
The ﬁrst year of operations of Lykke exchange has shown the viability of the semi-
trusted architecture that allows a compromise between usability, liquidity and security of
funds in the toxic internet environment.
The transparency of blockchain technology provides unique research opportunities: the
trade log has the resolution to participants ID. Potential research directions include in
particular:
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 Empirical market microstructure of digital assets marketplace and scaling laws;
 Optimal market design;
 Intraday yield curves estimation;
 Market participants ecology and behavioral studies;
 Market abuse detection (wash trades, market price manipulation, etc.); and
 Settlement ﬁnality research.
Notes
1. www.bitmaintech.com/productDetail.htm?pid=0002016052907243375530DcJIoK0654
2. This eﬀect is often referred to as Metcalfe’s Law: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metcalfe%27s_law
3. Market Overview, bitcoincharts.com
4. https://github.com/OpenAssets/open-assets-protocol/blob/master/speciﬁcation.mediawiki
5. Depends on transaction, see also Maximum Transaction Rate on Bitcoin Wiki.
6. https://blockchain.info/charts/n-transactions
7. https://gist.github.com/gavinandresen/e20c3b5a1d4b97f79ac2
8. http://lightning.network/docs/
9. https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contract#Example_7:_Rapidly-adjusted_.28micro.29payments_to_a_
pre-determined_party
10. http://ozlabs.org/rusty/ln-deploy-draft-01.pdf
11. https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Lightning_Network#Hash_locks
12. https://github.com/LykkeCity/LykkeX
13. Paul Buchheit, Creator of Gmail, https://twitter.com/paultoo/status/328969714283995136
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